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fix: cap each extracted archive entry at 2 GB
`put` had no per-entry cap, unlike the legacy java path which capped every file at 2 GB through `intFile.SafeCopy`. At depth 1, one entry of an overlapping-entry zip bomb could decompress all the way to the 100 GB disk limit before anything stopped it.
- entries are now read through the same 2 GB cap (`intFile.PerFileReadLimit`, now exported). An entry over it is dropped after cap+1 bytes and the rest of the archive is still extracted
- `Resolver` gains `TruncatedReason`, so the truncation unknown says what happened ("an entry larger than 2.0 GiB was skipped", or the existing disk-limit text) instead of always blaming the limits
Signed-off-by: Alex Goodman <wagoodman@users.noreply.github.com>
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@@ -6,12 +6,13 @@ import (
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"io"
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)
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const perFileReadLimit = 2 * GB
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// PerFileReadLimit is the most read from any one archive entry, guarding against decompression bombs.
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const PerFileReadLimit = 2 * GB
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// SafeCopy bounds the copy to guard against decompression bombs when extracting from archives.
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func SafeCopy(writer io.Writer, reader io.Reader) error {
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numBytes, err := io.Copy(writer, io.LimitReader(reader, perFileReadLimit))
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if numBytes >= perFileReadLimit {
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numBytes, err := io.Copy(writer, io.LimitReader(reader, PerFileReadLimit))
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if numBytes >= PerFileReadLimit {
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return fmt.Errorf("zip read limit hit (potential decompression bomb attack)")
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}
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// Propagate decompression / read errors up to the caller. io.Copy
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