Files
syft/internal/spillbuf/buffer.go
T
Alex Goodman 1d25dfe4da fix(golang): bound allocations from UPX-packed binary headers (#5195)
* fix(golang): bound UPX decompression by what the input can justify

A UPX block's `sz_unc` was passed straight to `make([]byte, n)`, so four bytes of
attacker input spanned the full uint32 range. A ~300KB file could drive multi-GB
resident memory, which Go reports as a fatal runtime OOM that no `recover` on this
path can contain. Syft parses binaries out of arbitrary images, so that is reachable
from any scan.

Two bounds do the work, and UPX's own invariants make them exact:

- all blocks together reconstruct `p_filesize`, so a running remainder caps the sum.
  Bounding only per-block would leave the total at (block count x original size), so
  the remainder is the part that actually closes it
- `p_filesize` sizes the output buffer, so it is capped both absolutely and against
  the size of the file on disk. The absolute cap alone left a ~60 byte header able to
  claim 500MB; the ratio alone cannot work either, since LZMA encodes a run of N
  equal bytes in O(log N) and a `go:embed` of 120MB of zeros legitimately packs 209x

The output buffer is also allocated on the first block that survives validation
rather than up front, so a header claiming a large size with nothing decodable behind
it costs nothing.

Alongside that, several ways the block loop could be steered off its own buffer:

- `parseELFPTLoadOffsets` bounds-checked program headers with `phStart+phentsize >
  len(buf)`, which overflows for a `p_offset` near 2^64 and lets an out-of-range entry
  through into a slice index. Switched to the subtraction form, and a `phentsize`
  shorter than an ELF64 program header is rejected since the reads use fixed offsets
- block placement had the same overflow shape, and on failure it skipped the copy and
  fell through. `outputOffset` derives from the rejected offset, so a `p_offset` at the
  uint64 ceiling wrapped it to 0 and the next block landed on the reconstructed ELF
  header, still returning success. Out-of-range placement now ends the block chain,
  keeping the blocks already placed since those often carry `.go.buildinfo`
- the UPX 2-byte LZMA header carries `lc`/`lp` as nibbles and `pb` as three bits, so
  they can hold values LZMA does not permit. Folded into the props byte they wrap
  (`lc=15, lp=15, pb=7` gives 465, which truncates to 209) and the stream mis-decodes
  instead of failing
- blocks decode directly into a slice of the output buffer instead of a per-block
  buffer that is then copied, so one block no longer doubles peak memory
- the block count is capped: the size budget alone still allows millions of 12-byte
  blocks, each spinning up an LZMA reader

Verified against the `image-small-upx` fixture, a real `upx --best --lzma` binary:
four blocks, max `sz_unc` equal to `p_blocksize` exactly, blocks summing to 0.68 of
`p_filesize`, and a 1.96x expansion against the packed file, so every bound holds with
headroom on genuine output.

Note `p_blocksize` is deliberately not used as a ceiling on `sz_unc`. It adds nothing
the remainder does not already cover, and real output sits at exactly `p_blocksize`,
so it would run with zero headroom against a value the format does not promise.

Signed-off-by: Alex Goodman <wagoodman@users.noreply.github.com>

* fix(golang): report UPX binaries we cannot unpack as unknowns

A packed Go binary we fail to unpack means its packages are silently missing from the
SBOM. `getBuildInfo` checked the decompression error for nil and discarded it, so a
rejected file surfaced only the original `buildinfo.Read` error, and that one is
deliberately silenced because it is usually just "not a Go binary".

`decompressUPX` now marks the cases worth reporting with `errUPXDecompress`: it got
past the header and the method dispatch and still could not unpack the file. Everything
else stays quiet, which matters more than it sounds. `upx` defaults to NRV2B unless
`--lzma` is passed and only LZMA is implemented here, so treating any decompression
failure as reportable would attach a golang-cataloger unknown to every packed non-Go
binary in an image. Making the reportable case opt in rather than the quiet case a
growing list also means a guard added later is silent by default.

Signed-off-by: Alex Goodman <wagoodman@users.noreply.github.com>

* refactor(golang): drop the vendored xcoff parser

The only thing the golang cataloger read from it was `TargetMachine`, which is the same
two magic bytes `getGOARCHFromBin` had already matched on to dispatch there. So a full
XCOFF walk (string table, symbol table, every relocation table) ran to recover a value
that was already in hand.

`getGOARCHFromBin` reads those two bytes directly now. That is also strictly more
correct: `xcoff.NewFile` bailed with "no symbol table" when `symptr == 0`, so a stripped
XCOFF binary reported no arch at all.

Fixtures move to `testdata/xcoff/`, since they are no longer a package's own testdata.

Signed-off-by: Alex Goodman <wagoodman@users.noreply.github.com>

* feat(internal/file): report a reader's real size behind one helper

Bounds get written as "does this claim exceed what the reader actually holds", and the
subtlety is that a reader's own answer cannot be trusted: an `io.SectionReader` reports
the nominal length it was built with, so one constructed with `1<<63-1` will happily
claim to hold 8EB. Confirming the last byte is readable is what separates a real size
from a nominal one.

Returns `(int64, bool)` rather than a bare size, since there are five ways to not know
and collapsing them to 0 makes every caller reinvent "0 means stop bounding".

The doc also names the wrapper trap: a type embedding `io.ReaderAt` as an interface
promotes only `ReadAt`, so it answers no size at all however large the reader beneath it
is, and a bound written against it silently does nothing.

Signed-off-by: Alex Goodman <wagoodman@users.noreply.github.com>

* fix(golang): bound every section a reader can expand, not just the name table

`CheckSectionNameTable` bounds the one section `elf.NewFile` expands while parsing, which
is enough for a caller that only parses. It is not enough for one that goes on to read
sections: those are expanded lazily, so a 260KB ELF declaring a compressed `.symtab`
drove 1.3GB of allocation through `goversion`, which opens the file with `debug/elf`
inside its own package and cannot be routed through `elfutil.NewFile`.

`CheckAllSections` is that gate, and is deliberately named as the superset so the
relationship to the narrow one is structural rather than documented.

Also exports `ErrDeclaredSizeExceeded`. A refusal here costs the SBOM a package, so
callers report it as an unknown, and matching on an error string to decide that is not
something to build a reporting policy on.

A ruleguard rule now flags `buildinfo.Read` and `version.ReadExeFromReader` outside
`scan_binary.go`. Both open `debug/elf` internally and are only bounded there by the
wrappers that gate the reader first, which the existing rule on `elf.NewFile` could not
see through.

Signed-off-by: Alex Goodman <wagoodman@users.noreply.github.com>

* feat(internal/spillbuf): sparse offset-addressed buffer that spills to disk

For output that arrives out of order, at offsets the input itself declares: a
decompressor placing extents, an archive rebuilding a file from chunks. A plain `[]byte`
cannot do that without either pre-sizing to a length the input claims or growing to the
furthest offset it names, and both hand a hostile input an allocation knob.

The load-bearing property is that it reports only what it actually stored. `Size` is the
contiguous run written from offset zero and a read past it is `io.EOF`, never the zeros
an unwritten region would hand back for free. Sparse storage serving holes as real
content is what lets a write offset stand in for output nothing produced, so anything
sizing an allocation against this reader (`saferio` in `debug/elf` does exactly that)
stays bounded by work actually done.

`FirstGap` answers where the next write fits, so callers filling holes do not need the
extent bookkeeping and cannot re-derive that rule wrongly, and it only reports gaps
lying entirely inside `[0, within)`. The extent type is unexported for the same reason.

The rest of the contract worth stating: reads and writes after `Close` fail with
`os.ErrClosed` rather than looking like an empty buffer, and a write that fails leaves
the buffer unchanged.

Memory is bounded by the limit rather than by how much is written: filling 1MB and
filling 64MB cost about the same. What lands on disk past that limit is the caller's
bound to set, not this package's. Growth is geometric and capped, because sizing the
tier to exactly what each write needs is quadratic once a caller streams through it in
small chunks.

The golang cataloger is the only consumer today, and nothing else in the tree has this
shape.

Signed-off-by: Alex Goodman <wagoodman@users.noreply.github.com>

* fix(golang): rebuild UPX binaries through spillbuf and read the reconstruction everywhere

Two amplification paths were still reachable. A 128 byte input allocated 16MB by
trusting `sz_cpr` before weighing it against the bytes the file actually holds, and the
reconstruction was assembled in a `[]byte` sized from the header's declared original
size, so a 301KB input allocated 300MB.

The reconstruction is a `spillbuf.Buffer` now, which is what makes the second one go
away: blocks are placed at the offsets the file declares, nothing is pre-sized from a
claim, and the reader's length is the contiguous run actually rebuilt. That last part is
the invariant everything downstream leans on. A reader reporting the declared size would
serve the holes between placed blocks as zeros it never stored, and a 64 byte block
parked at `p_filesize-64` then made a 300KB input hand out a 64MB reader: measured, that
drove 269MB through `getBuildInfo` and returned nothing, silently.

Placement and storage are separate concerns. `upx.go` places blocks at the offsets the
file declares and asks the buffer how much was rebuilt and where the next gap is; it
knows nothing about temp files or memory limits.

The remaining bounds are ratios against the input wherever they can be, since an
absolute ceiling only ever drops a large legitimate binary. The one absolute left is on
`p_filesize`, because padding an input is nearly free, and the LZMA dictionary is paid
for in its own block's `sz_cpr`.

Interface change: `scanFile` takes a context and hands back the reconstruction for each
binary that turned out to be packed, and the caller owns it. Everything after the build
info read (crypto settings, arch, symbols, the version scan) reads it, so a packed
binary no longer reports its packages with no symbols at all.

Also narrows what gets reported. This cataloger runs on every executable in an image, so
reporting every `getBuildInfo` error attached an unknown to every corrupt ELF, odd PE and
non-Go Mach-O slice in it. Now only four gaps, the ones that cost the SBOM something
syft could have had: a packed file we could not decode (`errUPXDecompress`), a header
the size bounds refused (`errUPXSizeRefused`), a reconstruction that came up short
(`errUPXPartial`), and an ELF expansion `elfutil` declined
(`ErrDeclaredSizeExceeded`). An unimplemented UPX method stays quiet on purpose: `upx`
defaults to NRV2B and only LZMA is implemented here, so reporting it would attach an
unknown to most packed non-Go binaries in an image.

That filtering is a new pattern. No other cataloger picks which of its errors become
unknowns, and the reason this one does is that it runs on every executable in an image
rather than on files a glob already selected.

Signed-off-by: Alex Goodman <wagoodman@users.noreply.github.com>

* chore: ignore local spec/ planning notes

`/specs` was already ignored; `/spec` is the same thing under the singular name and was
not, so working notes landed in commits.

Signed-off-by: Alex Goodman <wagoodman@users.noreply.github.com>

* refactor(golang): name what the unpack hands back, not where it stores it

the scan's signatures said `*spillbuf.Buffer` all the way down, which told
every reader below the scan that it cares whether the reconstruction lives in
memory or on disk. it does not. two interfaces instead, each naming only what
its side actually uses:

- `unpackedContents` for the consumers: `ReaderAt`, `Closer`, and a `Size` that
  is the contiguous run rebuilt from zero
- `blockSink` for the decoder, which additionally needs `WriterAt` and
  `FirstGap` to place blocks

this costs one thing worth flagging. `Close` on a nil `*spillbuf.Buffer` was
nil-safe, so callers just deferred it; widened into an interface, a nil pointer
becomes a non-nil interface and the same call panics. `closeUnpacked` absorbs
that, and it is now the only way an owner releases contents. `readerFor`,
`seekerFor` and `closeUnpacked` are the three places that resolve the nil.

Signed-off-by: Alex Goodman <wagoodman@users.noreply.github.com>

* docs(elfutil): say that CheckAllSections is the decompression-bomb gate

the doc led with "bounds every section syft can drive debug/elf into
decompressing", which describes the mechanism without ever naming what it is
defending against. a reader landing on the call site could not tell that this
is the decompression-bomb check.

state the attack instead: a compressed section header declares its own
decompressed size, debug/elf believes that number and allocates it on open, and
nothing forces it to match what the compressed bytes actually yield. the 260KB
ELF that drove 1.3GB of allocation now lives in the doc rather than only at the
one call site that happened to mention it.

comments only.

Signed-off-by: Alex Goodman <wagoodman@users.noreply.github.com>

* docs(golang): move the overflow note onto the bounds test it describes

the "subtraction form" note sat above the phStart assignment with ten lines of
wrap analysis between it and the `if` it was talking about, so the subtraction
it names reads as missing. it is `hdrLen-phStart < phentsize`.

move it onto that test and name the form it is avoiding (`phStart+phentsize >
hdrLen`, which can overflow past the buffer end) so the referent is not several
paragraphs away.

comments only.

Signed-off-by: Alex Goodman <wagoodman@users.noreply.github.com>

* chore(golang): drop the internal/ README left over from xcoff

that README existed to record where the vendored xcoff package came from and
that Go keeps it internal, which is a provenance note worth having while
third-party code sat there. dropping xcoff took the reason with it, and
repurposing it to point at gotestdata just made it redundant: gotestdata has
its own README covering why it is under internal/, why it is not testdata/, and
what belongs in each.

internal/ now holds one self-documenting directory.

Signed-off-by: Alex Goodman <wagoodman@users.noreply.github.com>

---------

Signed-off-by: Alex Goodman <wagoodman@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-09-10 09:21:19 -04:00

331 lines
12 KiB
Go

// Package spillbuf provides a sparse, offset-addressed byte buffer that keeps a bounded amount in memory
// and spills the rest to a temp file.
//
// It exists for the shape where output arrives out of order, at offsets the input itself declares: a
// decompressor placing extents, an archive rebuilding a file from chunks. A plain []byte cannot do that
// without either pre-sizing to a length the input claims or growing to the furthest offset it names, and
// both hand a hostile input an allocation knob.
//
// The buffer reports only what it actually stored. Size is the contiguous run written from offset zero,
// and a read past it is io.EOF rather than the zeros an unwritten region would otherwise hand back. That
// distinction is the whole point: sparse storage serves holes as zeros for free, so a reader that reported
// a length covering them would let a write offset stand in for real output. Anything sizing an allocation
// against this reader (debug/elf's saferio does exactly that) would then allocate bytes nothing produced.
//
// Allocation is bounded by the memory limit rather than by how much is written: filling 1MB and filling
// 64MB cost about the same, because everything past the limit goes to the file. Only memory is bounded
// here: how much ends up on disk is whatever the caller writes, so bounding that stays the caller's job.
package spillbuf
import (
"errors"
"fmt"
"io"
"math"
"os"
"slices"
"github.com/anchore/syft/internal/tmpdir"
)
// DefaultMemLimit is how much a buffer keeps in memory before it spills, when the caller does not say.
// Small on purpose: the memory tier saves a temp file for the common small case, it is not a place to
// hold output. A limit large enough to matter is a limit large enough to be an amplification path.
const DefaultMemLimit int64 = 1 << 20 // 1MB
// ErrNoTempDir is returned when a buffer needs to spill and has nowhere to spill to.
var ErrNoTempDir = errors.New("no temp dir available to spill to")
// Buffer is a sparse, offset-addressed buffer. The zero value is not usable; call New.
//
// Storage is two tiers with a fixed boundary: bytes below memLimit live in mem, bytes at or past it live
// in file. Nothing ever moves between them, so an offset belongs to exactly one tier for the life of the
// buffer and the only case needing care is a range that straddles the boundary.
//
// Not safe for concurrent use. Every consumer writes from a single goroutine, and guarding it would cost
// each write an uncontended lock for no reader.
type Buffer struct {
td *tmpdir.TempDir
memLimit int64
// mem holds [0, memLimit). Grown geometrically to fit what has been written, never past the limit.
mem []byte
// file holds [memLimit, ...), created on the first write that reaches there, so a buffer that stays
// small never touches disk. remove deletes it on Close.
file *os.File
remove func()
// written is the set of ranges stored, sorted by start and merged, so runs of adjacent writes collapse
// to one entry rather than growing per call. Everything the buffer reports comes from it.
written []extent
closed bool
}
// extent is a half-open byte range that has been written.
//
// Unexported on purpose. What a caller needs to know about the contents is answered by Size and FirstGap;
// handing out the bookkeeping invites re-deriving those at the call site and getting them subtly wrong,
// which is the bug this package exists to prevent.
type extent struct {
start, end int64
}
// Option configures a Buffer.
type Option func(*Buffer)
// WithMemLimit sets how many bytes are held in memory before the buffer spills to disk. Zero sends every
// write to the temp file. Negative is treated as zero.
//
// Peak allocation is a small multiple of this, since growing the tier holds the old copy alongside the
// new one and the new one may be rounded up past what was asked for.
func WithMemLimit(n int64) Option {
return func(b *Buffer) {
b.memLimit = max(n, 0)
}
}
// New returns a buffer that spills into td.
//
// td may be nil only when every write is known to stay inside the memory limit; a write past it then
// fails with ErrNoTempDir rather than allocating. Nothing is created on disk until a write needs it.
func New(td *tmpdir.TempDir, opts ...Option) *Buffer {
b := &Buffer{td: td, memLimit: DefaultMemLimit}
for _, opt := range opts {
opt(b)
}
return b
}
// split divides a range of n bytes starting at off across the two tiers, reporting how many bytes fall in
// each. The file portion starts at off+inMem.
func (b *Buffer) split(off, n int64) (inMem, inFile int64) {
if off >= b.memLimit {
return 0, n
}
inMem = min(n, b.memLimit-off)
return inMem, n - inMem
}
// fileOffset translates a buffer offset at or past the limit into an offset within the spill file.
func (b *Buffer) fileOffset(off int64) int64 { return off - b.memLimit }
// WriteAt stores p at off. Writes may land anywhere, in any order, and may overlap. A write that fails
// leaves the buffer as it was.
func (b *Buffer) WriteAt(p []byte, off int64) (int, error) {
if b.closed {
return 0, fmt.Errorf("spillbuf: write to a closed buffer: %w", os.ErrClosed)
}
if off < 0 {
return 0, fmt.Errorf("spillbuf: negative offset %d", off)
}
if len(p) == 0 {
return 0, nil
}
// subtraction form so off+len(p) cannot wrap into a small in-range end
if off > math.MaxInt64-int64(len(p)) {
return 0, fmt.Errorf("spillbuf: write of %d bytes at %d overflows", len(p), off)
}
inMem, inFile := b.split(off, int64(len(p)))
// the fallible half goes first: once the memory tier is stamped the old bytes are gone, so a file
// write that fails afterward would report failure over a buffer it had already changed
if inFile > 0 {
if err := b.writeFile(p[inMem:], b.fileOffset(off+inMem)); err != nil {
return 0, err
}
}
if inMem > 0 {
b.writeMem(p[:inMem], off)
}
b.record(extent{start: off, end: off + int64(len(p))})
return len(p), nil
}
func (b *Buffer) writeMem(p []byte, off int64) {
if need := off + int64(len(p)); int64(len(b.mem)) < need {
// geometric, capped at the limit. Sizing to exactly what each write needs looks tidier and is
// quadratic: a caller streaming a block in 32KB chunks reallocates and copies the whole tier every
// chunk, so filling 1MB costs ~16MB of allocation.
grown := min(b.memLimit, max(need, 2*int64(len(b.mem))))
// sized to exactly the geometric target rather than grown through append: append rounds the new
// capacity up past what was asked for, and the tier is already capped, so the slack is pure waste
mem := make([]byte, grown)
copy(mem, b.mem)
b.mem = mem
}
copy(b.mem[off:], p)
}
func (b *Buffer) writeFile(p []byte, off int64) error {
if b.file == nil {
if b.td == nil {
return ErrNoTempDir
}
f, remove, err := b.td.NewFile("syft-spill-*.bin") //nolint:gocritic // removal happens in Close
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("spillbuf: unable to create spill file: %w", err)
}
b.file, b.remove = f, remove
}
if _, err := b.file.WriteAt(p, off); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("spillbuf: unable to write to spill file: %w", err)
}
return nil
}
// ReadAt returns bytes this buffer actually stored. A read starting at or past Size is io.EOF, and one
// running past it is short, because everything beyond is a hole the buffer never held.
func (b *Buffer) ReadAt(p []byte, off int64) (int, error) {
if b.closed {
return 0, fmt.Errorf("spillbuf: read from a closed buffer: %w", os.ErrClosed)
}
if off < 0 {
return 0, fmt.Errorf("spillbuf: negative offset %d", off)
}
if len(p) == 0 {
return 0, nil
}
size := b.Size()
if off >= size {
return 0, io.EOF
}
// bounded by Size, so every byte in [off, off+want) was written and both tiers really hold theirs
want := min(int64(len(p)), size-off)
inMem, inFile := b.split(off, want)
// guarded rather than relying on a zero-length copy: when off is past the limit the slice expression
// itself is out of range, since mem is only as long as what was written into it
if inMem > 0 {
copy(p[:inMem], b.mem[off:off+inMem])
}
if inFile > 0 {
if err := readFullAt(b.file, p[inMem:want], b.fileOffset(off+inMem)); err != nil {
return int(inMem), fmt.Errorf("spillbuf: unable to read spill file: %w", err)
}
}
if want < int64(len(p)) {
return int(want), io.EOF
}
return int(want), nil
}
// readFullAt fills p from r. A short read is an error rather than a short return: the caller has already
// bounded the range by what was written, so the file failing to deliver means it is not what we left.
func readFullAt(r io.ReaderAt, p []byte, off int64) error {
for read := 0; read < len(p); {
n, err := r.ReadAt(p[read:], off+int64(read))
read += n
if err != nil {
return err
}
}
return nil
}
// Size reports the contiguous run written from offset zero, which is the length this buffer is willing to
// stand behind. Deliberately not the furthest offset written: see the package doc for why the two are not
// interchangeable.
//
// record keeps the set merged and sorted, so the run from zero is at most the first two entries and the
// loop stops there: the cost this adds to every ReadAt is effectively constant, not a scan of the set.
func (b *Buffer) Size() int64 {
var covered int64
for _, e := range b.written {
if e.start > covered {
break
}
covered = max(covered, e.end)
}
return covered
}
// FirstGap returns the offset of the earliest unwritten run of at least size bytes lying entirely within
// [0, within), and whether there is one. Callers that place output at offsets of their own choosing use it
// to fill what they left behind, without needing the buffer's bookkeeping.
//
// The arithmetic is in subtraction form throughout: within comes from caller input and the result is used
// as a write offset, so a wrap here would be a write nobody bounded.
func (b *Buffer) FirstGap(size, within int64) (int64, bool) {
if b.closed || size < 0 || within < 0 {
return 0, false
}
var at int64
for _, e := range b.written {
// once the cursor is at the bound there is nothing left to offer, and it only moves forward
if at >= within {
return 0, false
}
// the gap ahead of this extent ends at whichever comes first, the extent or the bound
end := min(e.start, within)
if end > at && end-at >= size {
return at, true
}
at = max(at, e.end)
}
if at <= within && within-at >= size {
return at, true
}
return 0, false
}
// record merges e into the written set, keeping it sorted by start with no overlapping or adjacent pairs.
func (b *Buffer) record(e extent) {
if e.end <= e.start {
return
}
// inserted in place rather than appended and re-sorted: the set is already ordered, so a run of
// ascending writes (the common case) stays linear
i, _ := slices.BinarySearchFunc(b.written, e, func(x, y extent) int {
return cmpInt64(x.start, y.start)
})
b.written = slices.Insert(b.written, i, e)
merged := b.written[:1]
for _, cur := range b.written[1:] {
last := &merged[len(merged)-1]
if cur.start <= last.end {
last.end = max(last.end, cur.end)
continue
}
merged = append(merged, cur)
}
b.written = merged
}
func cmpInt64(x, y int64) int {
switch {
case x < y:
return -1
case x > y:
return 1
}
return 0
}
// Close releases the spill file, if one was ever created, and drops the memory tier. Safe on a nil
// receiver and safe to call more than once. Reads and writes after it fail with os.ErrClosed.
func (b *Buffer) Close() error {
if b == nil {
return nil
}
b.mem = nil
b.written = nil
b.closed = true
if b.file == nil {
return nil
}
err := b.file.Close()
if b.remove != nil {
b.remove()
}
b.file, b.remove = nil, nil
return err
}